Subverting Local Institutions: Arresting Social Capital Formation and Environmental Conservation in Latin America by unknown
IASCP Biennial Conference 
Bloomington, Indiana 
31 May through 4 June 2000 
 
SUBVERTING LOCAL INSTITUTIONS: 
ARRESTING SOCIAL CAPITAL FORMATION AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION IN LATIN AMERICA 
 
Douglas Southgate 
Department of Agricultural Economics 
Ohio State University 
(southgate.1@osu.edu) 
 
and 
 
Hugo Ramos 
San Salvador, El Salvador 
(hramos@ejje.com) 
 
 
Much of what is written about local institutions for natural resource management 
in the developing world is more an exercise in celebration than in analysis.  That said, it 
cannot be denied that rural communities in various places have managed to establish their 
own arrangements for handling environmental conflicts that, left unresolved, would 
diminish agricultural output, the quality of forest management, and so forth.  Hayami 
(1990), for example, calls our attention to the contributions that local rules for water 
allocation have made to irrigated rice production in Southeast and East Asia. 
 
Serviceable though they often are, traditional institutions have been exposed to 
great stress in modern times.  Sometimes, the stress has had to do with population 
growth.  Especially in areas experiencing rapid immigration – along agricultural frontiers, 
for instance – winning the consensus needed to effect or even to maintain rules governing 
access to natural resources has been a considerable challenge.  But by no means has 
institutional deterioration been an exclusively demographic phenomenon.  All too 
frequently, local institutions have deteriorated as a result of being undermined by outside 
authorities. 
 
This process was obvious during the era of European colonialism.  But by the 
middle of the twentieth century, the source of subversion had shifted to national capitals 
in the developing world.  The nationalization of Nepal's village (panchayat) forests in 
1958 is a case in point.  Perhaps influenced indirectly by early contributions to the 
economic literature on open access problems – in which no distinction was made between 
resources owned by no one at all and common properties, which by definition are owned 
by a well-identified group that typically observes its own resource use and management 
guidelines – officials in Katmandu decided that all tree-covered land needed to belong to 
the government.  Had the public sector actually invested in management and controlled 
access, environmental benefits might have accrued, although the injustice of taking 
village resources without compensation would have had to be redressed.  But 
management never occurred.  Neither was access controlled.  All the results of 
nationalization, then, were negative, forests in which villagers previously had some sort 
of ownership stake – an imperfect one, some might contend – being converted into a truly 
open access resource (Bromley and Chapagain, 1984). 
 
Wholesale land appropriation is not the only way that subversion has been, and 
continues to be, accomplished.  National policies, often adopted ostensibly to protect 
local institutions and their members, can actually undermine those same institutions, 
diminish individuals’ incentives to engage in collective action, or both.  In particular, 
paternalistic laws and regulations prevent local institutions from engaging in normal, 
commercial activities that would benefit their members.  This is true of comunas in the 
tropical forests of northwestern Ecuador and of the agrarian reform cooperatives in El 
Salvador, both of which are examined in this paper. 
 
The two case studies suggest that the viability of local institutions often depends 
on policy changes that allow them to function like limited-liability corporations, with 
their members becoming, for all intents and purposes, shareholders.  Pressure for reform 
of this sort is sure to intensify as the value of community resources grows. 
 
Depletion of Community Forests in Northwestern Ecuador 
 
The shortcomings of paternalistic restrictions on local institutions are readily 
apparent in northwestern Ecuador, where most of the country’s timber is harvested and 
where forests are being cleared at a rapid pace to make way for new cropland and 
pasture. 
 
A curious aspect of deforestation in the region is that it is occurring in spite of 
policy changes intended to reward timber production.  In particular, tariff- and non-tariff 
trade barriers – adopted when Ecuador pursued a development strategy predicated on 
import-substituting industrialization (ISI) – were dismantled during the late 1980s and 
early 1990s.  While those barriers were still in place, domestic prices for plywood and 
other products were artificially high and the market value of raw materials were too low.  
Trade liberalization has caused the gap between internal and border prices for finished 
products to close.  However, as Southgate et al. (forthcoming) have documented, log 
prices in Ecuador remain well below efficient levels.  In particular, nominal protection 
rates – defined as the difference between domestic and border prices divided by border 
prices – for unprocessed timber range from –65 to –78 percent. 
 
To come to grips with why this inefficiency persists, one must first bear in mind 
the monopolistic conditions that arose before trade liberalization, under ISI.  When and 
where commerce is restricted between a small economy, like Ecuador’s, and the outside 
world, lack of competition is bound to be a chronic problem.  In many markets, domestic 
demand can accommodate the output from, at most, a handful of firms.  These firms, 
needless to say, are in an excellent position to exercise monopoly power.  During 
Ecuador’s experiment with ISI, for example, practically all the country’s plywood was 
produced by just two companies, which, as has been mentioned already, charged a lot for 
their output and did not pay very much for raw material inputs. 
 
Trade liberalization removed an important barrier to the sort of competition 
required to drive up log prices, which is a necessary (though probably insufficient) 
condition for sustainable natural resource development.  Cheap raw materials ought to 
have encouraged new firms to get involved in Ecuadorian forestry, at least as buyers.  
However, other barriers have remained in place.  One relates to corruption, which 
Southgate et al. (forthcoming) emphasize has been exacerbated by a complex set of 
environmental regulations adopted in 1995.  The burden of suborning government 
personnel in a position to enforce restrictions on harvesting, log transportation, and other 
activities need not be very onerous for existing companies, which possess the sort of 
knowledge and contacts needed to keep bribery expenses to a minimum.  By contrast, 
potential entrants lack these advantages.  Liable to suffer much more from corruption, 
they are apt to stay out of the business entirely. 
 
Weak property rights are another impediment to new investment in the 
Ecuadorian forestry sector.  Old colonization laws – which assigned property rights to 
people who occupied, cleared, and farmed land formerly covered with trees – have been 
removed from the books.  However, land invasions continue, especially where formal 
adjudication of property rights is yet to occur.  Since adjudication delays are common – 
and invasion risks are particularly serious – in tree-covered hinterlands, the lack of 
secure, formal ownership rights helps to explain why forestry investment is limited, 
generally, and the forestry sector is not attracting new entrants, specifically. 
 
Likewise, weak formal tenure and associated invasion risks are a problem for 
comunas (called ejidos in Mexico and Central America), which occupy vast tree-covered 
tracts.  Only during the past few years has significant effort been dedicated to delimiting 
communal holdings in northwestern Ecuador and other parts of the country.  In spite of 
recent progress, many forested hectares remain unadjudicated. 
 
Since passage of the 1994 Agrarian Law, which strengthened property rights in 
rural areas, comunas have enjoyed limited scope to buy and to sell real estate, although 
the Ministry of Agriculture must still approve major transactions.  Relaxing what used to 
be a total ban on land transactions, stipulated in the Comunas Law of 1937, local 
communities can now use real estate as collateral, thereby gaining access to financial 
markets.  Furthermore, the 1994 law allows comuna members to acquire individual 
tenure in their respective holdings. 
 
Thousands of rural households in various parts of Ecuador have taken advantage 
of these policy changes.  Exceptional in this regard is the northwestern part of the 
country, where very little privatization has occurred.  It is entirely sensible to manage 
forests in large, unified parcels, as opposed to the 50-hectare plots traditionally awarded 
to the beneficiaries of land distribution initiatives.  However, the 1994 Agrarian Law did 
not rescind the 1937 Comunas Law, which circumscribes community-level governance in 
various ways.  By and large, the law hinders comunas’ participation in the market 
economy as well as their ability to develop natural resources efficiently. 
 
One restriction on governance relates to the terms of communal office-holders.  
To be specific, the 1937 law requires that local governing cabildos stay in office for just 
twelve months.  The frequent leadership turnover that results from this arrangement 
exposes forest dwellers to business practices that are unfair, uncompetitive, or both.  
Accusations that community leaders have been bribed to accept logging agreements that 
stipulate low prices and weak environmental controls are common in northwestern 
Ecuador.  Although specific evidence of local malfeasance is difficult to come by, it is 
undeniable that stumpage values are very low in the region, averaging just a few dollars 
per cubic meter of standing timber (Southgate et al., forthcoming).  As a rule, logging 
takes place with little or no attention paid to containing environmental damage. 
 
Poor Performance of Agrarian Reform Cooperatives in El Salvador 
 
The consequences of giving local communities control over resources while 
simultaneously interfering with their internal governance and limiting their commercial 
decision-making prerogatives are no less disappointing in El Salvador than they have 
been in Ecuador. 
 
Traditional group tenure, of the sort "protected" by Ecuador’s Comunas Law of 
1937, has not existed in El Salvador since the onset of rapid growth in coffee production 
and exports.  In 1882, common property was formally abolished, thereby allowing for an 
expansion of privately-owned, commercial farms of medium and large size.  For the rural 
poor to produce food, temporary access was given to farm fields, but always subject to 
specific agreements between landowners and tenants. 
 
The concentration of land and other wealth that was reenforced during the coffee 
boom of the late 1800s and early 1900s led to conflict at various times during the 
twentieth century.  In October 1979, after several years of mounting violence, a group of 
military officers seized power.  Shortly afterwards, they stated their commitment to 
achieving a "new economic and social order" by means of comprehensive agrarian 
reform as well as the nationalization of financial and marketing institutions (Prosterman, 
Riedinger, and Temple, 1981; Thiesenhusen, 1995). 
 
The reform program, announced in March 1980, was aimed squarely at the 
economic base of El Salvador’s rural elite.  A limit of 150 hectares was placed on what 
any single individual could own, with land in excess of this limit subject to state 
expropriation.  To make sure that former owners did not gradually reacquire the land they 
lost due to agrarian reform, expropriated holdings were assigned to cooperative 
associations, which were forbidden to sell real estate.  The March 1980 program also 
gave tenant farmers the right to claim freehold title in up to seven hectares used by them.   
Nationalization of financial and marketing institutions was effected as well (Prosterman, 
Riedinger, and Temple, 1981; Thiesenhusen, 1995). 
 
Political support for agrarian reform was consolidated during the early 1980s, 
when El Salvador’s civil war was especially intense.  Important in this regard was the 
decision of Napoleón Duarte, the leader of the Christian Democratic Party, to join the 
governing junta in January 1980, approximately two months before the agrarian reform 
was decreed.  In March 1982, the junta stepped down and a constituent assembly, in 
which Christian Democrats did not enjoy an absolute majority over a combination of 
right-wing parties, took office.  Nevertheless, one of the assembly's first acts was to ratify 
the entire agrarian reform, issued originally as a series of junta decrees.  Further 
reenforcement occurred in May 1982, when Alvaro Magaña, who was demonstrably 
committed to reform, was installed as provisional president (Strasma, 1989; 
Thiesenhusen, 1995). 
 
Agrarian reform was to proceed in three phases.  The first, which was carried out, 
affected 262 properties, each larger than 500 hectares.  Another 1,800 holdings, all 
between 100 and 500 hectares in size, were to be broken up during the second phase.  
Since these farms comprised the core of productive Salvadoran agriculture, it was 
decided that the vast majority would remain intact and in private hands; only 66 were 
confiscated.  Due to administrative constraints and limited funding, the third phase, 
which focused on the title claims of small-scale tenants, was not fully implemented 
(Prosterman, Riedinger, and Temple, 1981; Thiesenhusen, 1995). 
 
To say the least, conditions during the early 1980s were inauspicious for 
Salvadoran agriculture, generally, and the cooperatives established during the first phase 
of agrarian reform, specifically.  A sharp, global recession drove down prices for coffee 
and other commodities.  Also, the civil war took a major toll.  Of the 320 cooperatives 
that had been created during the first two years of agrarian reform, 28 were already 
abandoned by 1982 and another 21 were in danger of abandonment (Thiesenhusen, 
1995). 
 
A truer test of the viability of agrarian reform cooperatives was to come as the 
fighting wound down, especially after peace accords were signed in 1992.  By and large, 
that test has been failed.  The 328 cooperatives occupy 240,000 hectares of El Salvador’s 
best land.  In particular, FUSADES (1996) claims that they possess one-fifth of all the 
soils in the country falling in the top four categories featured in the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture’s eight-level classification scheme.  But of these resources, more than a 
quarter sat idle as of the middle 1990s (Shaw, 1997).  The impacts on commodity 
production have been considerable, even at the national scale. 
 
Cooperatives' poor performance as agricultural enterprises has much to do with 
political agendas at the time of their founding (Strasma, 1989).  While the general 
purpose of agrarian reform twenty years ago was to weaken the elite’s hold on economic 
and political life in the countryside, stabilizing rural communities with ties to the 
government was of great importance during the war.  As a reward for loyalty, cooperative 
members, who numbered between 22,000 and 30,000 during the 1980s, had much better 
access to public sector services than did the majority of rural dwellers.  Many of those 
members belonged to the governing Christian Democratic party. 
 The practical effect of agrarian reform has been to establish a new sort of 
hierarchy in the countryside.  Only 20 percent of the people living on cooperative lands 
are full-fledged members.  They serve as cooperative officers and reserve all the 
permanent jobs for themselves, family members, and friends.  The remainder of the 
cooperative population comprises settlers and refugees, who farm small plots if they are 
not offered occasional work paying a modest, daily wage.  It is the latter people who have 
suffered disproportionately from cooperatives’ poor performance.  For example, the ratio 
of wage jobs (typically held by non-members) to permanent positions (again, reserved for 
members) has fallen from 4-to-1 during the 1980s to 2-to-1 at present (Shaw, 1997).  At 
the same time, non-members’ access to health and other services provided by the public 
sector does not begin to compare with what members and their friends and relatives 
enjoy. 
 
Even if cooperative members had wanted to run their organizations in a more 
business-like manner, producing more output and employing more people and land as 
commercial opportunities were pursued, their ability to do so was sharply circumscribed 
for many years.  As has been mentioned already, there was great concern two decades 
ago that expropriated landowners would reacquire real estate, thereby undermining 
agrarian reform, if redistributed real estate could be bought and sold.  To avoid this 
outcome, cooperatives were prohibited from selling their holdings.  Similar to the effects 
of identical prohibitions in other countries, this prohibition excluded agrarian reform 
beneficiaries not just from real estate markets, but from financial markets as well, thereby 
discouraging the sort of investment needed to enhance or to maintain farm productivity 
(Strasma, 1989). 
 
Transfers of cooperative land are now permitted.  However, cooperatives still find 
themselves in a poor commercial position.  For one thing, few members and leaders have 
the type of managerial and marketing experience needed to compete successfully in 
national, regional, and international markets.  This problem is being addressed by a 
recently initiated training and institutional-strengthening project funded by the U.S. 
Agency for International Development. 
 
Another problem that the cooperatives continue to face is financial in nature.  
When rural properties were expropriated during the 1980s, former owners received 
compensation, part in cash and the remainder in agrarian reform bonds (which were 
already trading in the secondary market at a substantial discount in 1982).  Titles to these 
properties were held by the Salvadoran Institute for Agrarian Transformation (ISTA).  
Cooperatives acquiring titles likewise assumed a portion of the original debt.  By the 
middle 1990s, many cooperative leaders were contending that this debt could not be 
serviced, and hence should be forgiven.  This demand being met, cooperatives found 
themselves free of past liabilities.  However, they also found banks unwilling to extend 
them new credit (Shaw, 1997), which has created acute financial constraints. 
 
Unable to borrow money and lacking business expertise, some cooperatives are 
giving serious consideration to dissolving themselves.  Old restrictions on land sales 
having been jettisoned, subdivision of cooperative lands is now an option. 
 
The Option of Joint Ventures 
 
There are differences between traditional comunas in tropical forests and agrarian 
reform cooperatives.  The former have existed in Ecuador for a long time, since before 
passage of the 1937 law that gave them official status, while the latter represent a 
comparatively recent tenurial innovation, one made under the duress of rural insurrection.  
Regardless, general lessons emerge from this paper’s two case studies.  In particular, 
assigning non-transferable land rights to marginalized rural populations has yielded 
disappointing dividends in Ecuador as well as El Salvador. 
 
One response to poor performance is to invest in human capital, thereby raising 
managerial and marketing capacity.  This approach has been adopted in the 
aforementioned USAID project now being implemented in El Salvador.  But another way 
to improve the commercial viability of comunas and cooperatives is to encourage joint 
ventures with private-sector partners.  By no means does the latter approach preclude the 
former.  Indeed, human capital formation and the pursuit of joint ventures can be highly 
complementary.  However, it must be emphasized that joint ventures will be organized 
only if local institutions are allowed to make their own decisions about land transactions, 
modes of governance, and related matters.  For many of these institutions, a sensible 
reform is to convert themselves into limited-liability corporations, with their members 
becoming shareholders. 
 
In Ecuador, for example, laws that make it hard for comunas to develop and to 
implement long-term plans for renewable resource development also render those 
institutions unattractive as joint-venture partners.  One foreign investor who tried but 
failed to organize a joint forestry venture reported in 1993 that the current cabildo in the 
area where he was working always seemed to be asking for money to pay for a fiesta, 
motorcycle, or something else.  He reasoned that the group taking over in a few months 
would make similar requests, as would the cabildo that would take office one year later, 
and so on.  The expenses that would be incurred during the several decades required for 
standing timber to mature are obvious (Southgate et al., forthcoming). 
 
Private investors' reluctance to do business with local communities comprises a 
very serious impediment to sustainable resource development in northwestern Ecuador.  
The former group possesses the managerial expertise and marketing contacts required to 
derive full value from the natural resources owned by the latter group.  If joint ventures 
are not pursued, forest dwellers will continue to have no alternative besides selling timber 
in monopolized markets at inefficiently low prices. 
 
Similarly in El Salvador, joint ventures involving cooperatives have much appeal.  
To date, the strict prohibition that remains in place on private holdings larger than 150 
hectares has been one of the factors discouraging the sort of agricultural and agribusiness 
investment that other Central American nations have attracted.  The only large tracts of 
land in the country, of the sort that much of this investment requires, are owned by 
cooperatives.  Joint ventures would allow the labor and natural resources they possess to 
be combined with managerial and management expertise and capital, contributed by 
private partners.  Moreover, the recent record of El Salvador’s cooperatives suggests that, 
if joint ventures or some other alternative approach is not adopted, it is likely that 
cooperatives will continue to fail commercially.  This will lead to their being dissolved 
and all group land holdings being subdivided.  
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